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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of VIrgiuia 
AT RICHMOND 
ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
v. 
EDWIN D. HOOK, JR., AN INFANT, ETC. 
REcoRD No. 851. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
Your petitioner, Royal Indemnity Company, respect-
fully presents this petition that the opinion and judg-
ment of this Court, which opinion was rendered on 
January 15, 1981, be reheard, and sets out the following 
grounds upon which it relies: 
I. That it appears from the opinion, possibly from 
the failure of attorneys to present the matter properly 
to the Court, that the situation with reference to the 
question of agency has been misunderstood, and that 
Greathead held in the opinion to be the agent of the 
Company and his knowledge was therefore imputed to 
the Company, was not in fact and should not be held to 
be the agent of the Insurance Company. 
2. That the opinion in stating that agency had been 
sufficiently established failed to distinguish between the 
relationship of the Hare & Chase of Philadelphia, agent 
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for the Company, and the Roanoke Hare & Chase Com-
pany as finance dealers of automobile installment paper, 
with which the Insurance Company was not connected, 
and with which they had no concern, and the relation-
ship of the two companies with reference to the question 
of insurance. 
3. That the opinion in holding that the Insurance 
Company waived the warranties through the knowledge 
so charged as imputed to it, failed to recognize the dif-
ference between warranties incorporated in the policy 
and mere representation, which may be waived, since 
under the previous decisions of this Court warranties, 
notice of which is charged to the assured, whether by 
actual knowledge or by provision of the policy expressly 
so providing, are not waived by the knowledge of a local 
agent of the Company. 
4. That the opinion overlooks the warranty that the 
automobile in question belonged to Callie V. Goad and 
was to be used for pleaaure and business of the said 
Callie V. Goad and the fact, as to which no notice was 
proven, even to Greathead, that the automobile was to 
be used in the conunercial delivery business for deliver-
ing groceries. The statement in question was not only 
embodied in the policy as a warranty, but its materiality 
was in addition definitely proved by undisputed tes-
timony, in that higher premium would have been 
charged on the policy had it been stated that it was to 
be used in a conunercial way and for delivering gro-
ceries, that is for "commercial business use." 
In support of the above grounds, petitioner asks con-
sideration of the following treatment of the points in the 
order as set out above: 
1. The question of agency. 
It is stated in the opinion that it appeared from the 
evidence that the original purchase notes "passed back 
and forth between the Philadelphia Company and the 
Roanoke Company at their convenience." This was 
based upon the notice from the Roanoke Company call-
ing attention to installment due .January, 1927, and 
letter of September 10, 1926, from Hare & Chase of 
Philadelphia, notifying Rosser that it was the owner of 
the obligation, and an additional letter dated September 
18, 1926, from the Roanoke Hare & Chase Company to 
the effect that they had recently .handled these notes. 
It is submitted that this question, which also involves 
point No. 2 above, is based on a misunderstanding of the 
situation and a confusion of the relationship of the 
parties as automobile finance dealers and as insurance 
agents. It is stated in the opinion that the two concerns 
had held together in fair weather and they must hold 
together in foul. As stated, these letters deal purely 
with the matter of finance and have no connection with 
the question of insurance. The Insurance Company 
was in no way interested in what happened with the 
financial installment notes. These notes belonged ab-
solutely to one or the other finance company and could 
be sold back and forth as they pleased and as the holder 
might need the money. As a matter of fact, it does 
not appear in the record that the Roanoke Hare & Chase 
Company were the original holders of the note. These 
original notes were simply for the purchase price of the 
automobile and there 'Was no question of insurance in-
volved. It may well be that the Philadelphia Company 
used the Roanoke Company, an affiliated Company, to 
handle ministerial details of its business in this section. 
The original notes were made to and held by the Rust-
burg Motor Company, as specifically stated in the 
original letter from the Hare & Chase Company, dated 
September 10, 1926, and were purchased by the Phila-
delphia Company. It is noted that the date of that 
letter is the same as the dates of the notes and it thus 
appears that the Philadelphia Company first held the 
notes in which no question of insurance was involved 
(see Record, page 82). It is to be noted, therefore, 
that the letter of the Roanoke Company, dated Septem-
ber 18, 1926, simply stated that they had "handled the 
notes," not that they had owned them. This was literally 
true, as the notes had passed through their hands acting 
for the Philadelphia Company in the question of this 
automobile finance obligation. Thus it merely appears 
that the Philadelphia Company originally purchased 
these notes from the Rustburg Motor Company and 
later the Roanoke Company wrote calli:ng attention to 
a note due .January 10, 1927. Whether the Roanoke 
Company had acquired the note as owner or whether 
they were simply handling it as collecting agents for the 
Philadelphia Company does not appear. Even if they 
had acquired the notes it would show nothing but that 
there had be~n one transfer by which the Philadelphia 
Company had sold to the Roanoke Company. Thus, it 
will be seen that the notes had not passed back and forth 
at the convenience of the companies, and even if they 
had done so it was a matter with which the Insurance 
Company would have had no connection and with which 
they were in no way connected or concerned. 
It is true that after the sale to young Goad the pay-
ments demanded included both the automobile notes and 
insurance, but that again was no concern of the Com-
pany, as the Roanoke Company was the agent of Rosser 
and Mrs. Goad, as will hereinafter be shown, and 
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actually charged a premium for that service and ac-
cepted installment payments. The policy shows that 
the premium was $20.00, while the evidence of Mr. 
Rosser himself shows that he paid five installments of 
$7.40 each for the insurance, or a total of $37.00 (see 
Rec., p. 50) , and Mr. Rosser expressly states that no 
insurance was included in the original automobile notes 
(Rec., p. 51) and that the insurance which he paid 
covered nothing but the Indemnity policy ( Rec., p. 50) • 
If the Roanoke Company chose to take out the in-
surance for Mr. Rosser and Mrs. Goad, and to pay it 
and collect it back in installments, for which they made 
a charge of $17.00, certainly that was no concern of the 
Insurance Company. 
We also call attention to the fact that Greathead 
was originally called when the car was sold to young 
Goad, not as an insurance agent, but simply to advise 
with Mr. Rosser as to the proper method of handling 
the transfer transaction. It was only after he had given 
this advice and the matter has been determined that he 
suggested that they take out insurance and, as shown 
by the plaintiff's own witness, Thornhill, Mr. Greathead 
had stated that he was going to require insurance, to 
protect Rosser and the Finance Company ( Rec., p. 51) • 
There was never a statement by Greathead that he rep-
resented the Royal Company, or that his Company did 
so~ There was no suggestion in the negotiations that he 
acted as an insurance agent. He acted, according to his 
own statement, in behalf of Rosser and the Finance 
Company, and as was shown, his Roanoke Company 
charged a fee for that service. 
It is stated in the opinion that Hare & Chase were 
general agents for the Royal Indemnity Company. We 
submit there is no evidence in the record to show just 
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what was the nature of the agency of Hare & Chase of 
Philadelphia at the time the policy was written. The 
policy (Rec., p. 27) simply shows that they were agents 
or brokers at most. Their letter ( Rec., p. 82) had no 
reference to the Insurance Company whatsoev:er. The 
heading showed that they dealt in "automobile finance." 
· We think it important to call the attention of the Court 
to the effect of the opinion of the Court on this question 
of agency. Even granting for present purposes that 
Hare & Chase of Philadelphia were agents of the Insur-
ance Company.· The fact remains that their main busi-
ness was automobile finance. The evidence in the last 
analysis simply shows that they were affiliated with a 
separate and distinct corporation and that Greathead 
was an employee or representative of the Roanoke Com-
pany. .our search of authorities has revealed no case 
and the attorneys for the claimant have named none. 
which holds that an Insurance Company can be charged 
with knowledge of an employee of an entire separate 
and distinct corporation in a remote section from the 
agent, and we submit that the doctrine would be a most 
disastrous one from any business standpoint as well as 
legal standpoint. We may concede for the present that 
when an insurance company employs an agent, that 
agent must necessarily employ clerks and employees, 
and that the knowledge of such clerks and employees 
acquired on the business of the agent is imputable to the 
Company. In this case, the Company selects its agent 
and knows that they must employ clerks, but it ~lso 
knows that those clerks are direct employees of its agent 
and subject to the specific direction and control of the 
agent. On the other hand, in the instant case, Great-
head, whose knowledge has now been imputed to the 
Company, was not an employee of the agent and had no 
direct connection whatsoever with the admitted agent. 
He is an employee of a separate and distinct corpora-
tion and not subject to the control or direction of the 
agent of the Insurance Company. They did not hire 
him and they could not fire him. Even if it should be 
granted that the Philadelphia Company was a general 
agent (and there is no evidence in the record to show 
this except the letter heading written after the accident) 
it would be extending the rule far to hold that the 
Company would be bound under circumstances such as 
we have at bar. In such case if the Hare & Chase Com-
pany had a right to name a Corporation in Virginia as 
a sub-agent and the Company would be bound by the 
acts of the sub-agent and all employees of the sub-
agent, they could likewise name sub-agents over the 
whole United States and the Company would be charged 
with knowledge of the employees of all the clerks and 
representatives of such independent corporations, none 
of whom would be subject to the control or directionbf 
the agent selected by the Company. 
It is to be borne in mind that the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff to establish the agency. We construe 
the effect of the opinion of the Court to reverse that and 
put the burden on defendant to prove that an individual 
who conducted negotiations, brought into the matter by 
the claimant and Mrs. Goad, and who never claimed to · 
be the agent of the Company nor represented himself 
to be such and, who in fact never, so far as the record 
shows, mentioned the name of the Company, was not 
in fact the agent. The evidence in this case simply 
shows that Greathead was a representative of the Roa-
noke Company and the Roanoke Company was affiliated 
with the Philadelphia Company, the ·nature of the 
a:ffiliation not appearing, and· that the Philadelphia 
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Company was the agent of the Insurance Company. It 
is · not unusual for anyone interested in property by 
virtue of having a lien on it, to demand insurance pro-
tection and to handle the details of procuring the insur-
ance, getting the facts and circumstances necessary, and 
then presenting these facts to some agent of the Com-
pany, in order that the policy might be issued. Attorneys 
and real estate agents handling loans locally do this 
constantly. When they make loans they require the 
insurance to be taken, and in order to see that it is 
carried they assume for the debtor the burden of actually 
procuring the policy. Certainly they are under such 
circumstances not the agent of the Insurance Company, 
nor do they have any connection with the Insurance 
Company which issues the policy on the basis of the 
'information furnished it by the agent of the applicant. 
That was exactly what happened in this case. It may 
be true that in consideration of the payment of $17.00 
by the assured over and above the insurance premium, 
that Greathead may have undertaken the burden of 
handling all matters in relation to it for the assured and 
told him to notify him if anything happened, just as an 
attorney or any other lienor might do in order that they 
might keep up with and know just what did happen. 
It is not shown in the record, however, that the Insur-
ance Company ever authorized Greathead to adjust the 
claim or do. anything about it. The record, in the tes-
timony of Rosser himself, simply showed that he wrote' 
Mr. Greathead and then saw Mr. Thornhill, who at that 
time had no connection of any sort with either the Roa-
noke Company or the Insurance Company, and advised 
him of the accident. Rosser states that Mr. Greathead 
came and later advised him, not that -his Company ac-
cepted no responsibility in the premises, but that "the 
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Insurance Company would not be liable for the ac-
cident" (Rec., p. 40). Whether Greathead ever in fact 
communicated with the Company or not is not shown. 
In fact, Rosser specifically states that, having gotten no 
satisfaction from Mr. Greathead, he wrote the Phila-
delphia Company, and they replied to him under date 
of January 16, 1928, advising that they had no record 
of any transfer of the policy to cover his interest (Rec., 
p. 41). It appears that it was then the matter was 
referred to the office of Caskie, Frost & Coleman, At-
torneys for the Company, for investigation. In short, 
it officially appears that the communication with the 
Roanoke Company and Mr. Greathead brought no 
results whatsoever, nor in fact any investigation on the 
part of the Insurance Company, and that when he wrote 
the Philadelphia agent of the Company the matter was 
immediately taken up and referred to attorneys for 
investigation, which was made, and then Mr. Rosser 
was written by the attorneys on February 9, 1928, ad-
vising that the Company was of the opinion that there 
was no liability under the policy ( Rec., p. 42) . 
The Company must necessarily act through its agents, 
but it should have some choice in selecting its agents and 
knowing who its agents are and who it is on whom it will 
rely to select proper clerks and representatives and 
control them. It would have no protection if it is to be 
bound by conditions as appear in the instant case. This 
is recognized by authorities. 
In this connection we desire to call attention further 
to certain matters referred to in the opinion. The rule 
is set out on page 8 as to the knowledge of soliciting 
agents. In all the cases on this subject it will be found 
that there was no question of the agency. As stated in 
Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, 1st Ed. Vol. I, page 847, 
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~'an agent is not limited to the mere authority to issue 
policies, provided the risk is in his territory and he is 
supplied with bla:nk policies and has authority to fill up, 
CO'IJ!ntersign and deliver, and in such case his acts bind 
the Company." Greathead as was shown had no policies 
nor authority to execute same. 
It is also stated in the opinion (page 10} that 
Greathead wrote insurance for the Company. We 
respectfully submit that this statement arises from a 
misconception of the evidence. The only evidence on 
the point is that of the plaintiff's witness Thornhill who, 
it is true, in response to leading questions, made some 
general statements which might support this view. 
However, his statements were clarified on cross examina-
tion, as shown in the testimony ( Rec., pp. 53-4-5) in 
which he states that the Roanoke Company, for whom 
Greathead worked, was primarily a finance Company, 
that Thornhill himself had represented them, and that 
he wrote no policies nor did he have any supplies, that 
Greathead had his office with Thornhill and that he had 
never seen any supplies, and as to whether he or Great-
head had authority to issue policies, specifically states: 
"No, sir, he ha4 authority to take it up with the people 
in Roanoke and Mr. Greathead and myself but we 
ilidn,t actually write the policies/, He further spec-
ifically stated ( Rec., p. 54) that he did not know whether 
the Hare & Chase were agents or brokers, that he 
merely knew that if they procured insurance they got 
something out of it. This is not surprising in view of 
the fact that, as stated, the Roanoke Company charged 
a fee of $17.00 on a policy, the premium on which was 
$20.00. Thus it will be seen in the last analysis there is 
no evidence in the record that Greathead ever did or 
could himself write insurance, or in fact that his Com-
pany could do so. 
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It is also stated in the opinion (page 10) that the 
policy was written in Virginia and not in Pennsylvania. 
We respectfully submit that the evidence was misunder-
stood in this connection. It is true that the record does 
not show whether the names of Hare & Chase and of 
Lunsford & Sons, which appear on the policy, were 
actually signed or printed. The policy does show, how-
ever (Rec., p. 25, Sec. 4), that notice in case of claim 
should be sent directly to the head office of the Company 
or to the "agent who countersigned this policy," and 
(Rec., p. 28, clause 18) that the policy is dated for 
twelve months and time to be reckoned from the stand-
ard time "at the place of counter signature." This will 
show that the counter signature was not printed but 
written, as a counter signature in an insurance policy 
always is the last thing done. It also shows that Luns-
ford & Sons were the agent of the Company in Roanoke, 
without whose counter signature the policy would not be 
complete, and that thus they in fact signed the policy, 
which also shows that it was written by Hare & Chase 
of Philadelphia, and nowhere does it appear from the 
policy itself that the Roanoke Company had any con-
nection with the policy or with the Company. 
The Court cites the following cases to the effect that 
the notice of an insurance agent is imputable to the 
Company: 
Lynchburg Fire Insurance Company v. West, 76 Va. 
57 5. It is notable in that case that there was no question 
raised but that the agent in question was in fact rec-
ognized and desi~ated by the Company as its agent and 
the Court (at page 579) refers to the fact that if an 
agent is clothed with real or apparent authority to make 
a contract of insurance "his knowledge is imputable to 
the Company." In this case the evidence shows that 
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Greathead was not clothed with any such authority, 
could not and did not make the actual contract of insur-
ance, and that neither his name nor that of his Company 
appears thereon. On pages 584-5 of the opinion the 
Court specifically holds that in the West case the con-
ditions purported to have been violated were merely rep-
resentations and not warranties. 
Similarly in the case of Harrison v. Prov. Relief 
.A.aao.~ 141 V a. 659, it is to be noted that the Court, as 
set out in syllabus 2 refers to the fact that the· mis-
statements in the application were those for which 
neither the beneficiary nor the insurer was responsible. 
In this case the insured and Rosser, who subsequently 
took over the car, both knew exactly that the statements 
in the policy were untrue, in fact, they called Greathead 
in as their agent to advise them how to handle the trans-
action of the transfer of the car, and subsequent thereto 
the question of the insurance was taken up. It is further 
to be noted in the Harrison case also there is no question 
raised but that the agent was in fact the direct agent of 
the Company. It is further to be noted that in this 
Harrison case there was no discussion of the question 
of the effect of a positive warranty of the truth of state-
menta~ and as we shall presently show the doctrine in 
Virginia on the question of warranty is very different 
from that of mere representations. In the present case 
·also the named assured had absolutely no interest of any 
kind in the automobile insured. 
The Court also cites the case of Insurance Company 
v. Wilkinson~ 18 Wall. 222. This Wilkinson case is 
expressly distinguished in the case of N. Y. Life Ina. 
Co. v. Fletcher~ 117 U. S. -, 29 L. Ed. 984, 988. It 
is also expressly distinguished in Royal Insurance Co. v. 
Poole~ 148 Va. p. 878, in which the Court refers to the 
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Fletcher case. The Poole case and the Fletcher case 
are discussed below. 
The opinion of the Court in the present case (page 
18} refers to the failure of the Insurance Company to 
introduce evidence denying Greathead's authority, which 
evidence the opinion states must have been immediately 
at hand and available. We call the attention of the 
Court to the fact that there was nothing in the pleadings 
to show that the plaintiff would rely upon the fact that 
Greathead was an agent of the Company and the ques-
tion was first raised at the trial. The policy, as shown, 
was written in Philadelphia and countersigned in Roa-
noke. At the moment of the trial before the Court, 
without a jury, it was impossible on the spur of the 
moment to get any such evidence. The Company had, 
in fact, never heard of Greathead, nor did they know 
that such a man existed. They had no notice whatever 
that attempt would be made to charge it with his acts, or 
that of his Company, and therefore no means of pre-
paring for the contention. The whole record may be 
searched and every act relied upon to show that Great-
head was an agent will be found to be acts of Greathead 
himself or of his Roanoke employer, neither of whom 
are shown to have any direct connection whatsoever with 
the Company. The Insurance Company had done noth-
ing to indicate that Greathead was its agent. He 
through his Roanoke employer, and acting as an agent 
of Mrs. Goad and Rosser, for which a fee was charged, 
presented an application to the agents in Philadelphia. 
The Company acted on this application, the policy was 
prepared and sent back to the man who had presented 
the application and by him delivered to his principal. 
It is impossible for a Company to make a personal 
examination of the thousands of applications which come 
., 
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to it and its only method of protection is to make such 
application a part of the policy and the statements _ 
therein as warranties, which it specifically does, thereby 
informing the insured that they are making its policy 
on the basis of the truth of the stateme:Q.ts. It is the 
duty of the insured to read his policy and when he sees 
that the facts therein set out are not true, to notify the 
Company, otherwise, it is his own fault if he is not 
covered. If this be not true, then how can a Company 
possibly protect itself from wilful and deliberate mis-
statements which may be made. It is indeed in the 
hands of the Philistines. 
Bearing in mind that the burden is on the plaintiff to 
prove agency and the fact that the Company itself has 
done nothing, as shown above, to indicate that the man 
was its agent, and that neither he himself nor the Com-
pany he represents has claimed to be agents, and that 
certainly at worst the situation here is as consistent with 
the contention of the Company as with the contention 
with the claimant, the burden being on the plaintiff, it 
would seem clear that the question of agency has not 
been proven. The principle is akin to that well estab-
lished and recognized by numerous decisions of this 
Court, that where the facts proved by a plaintiff show 
that an accident may as well have resulted from one of 
two causes, for only one of which the defendant is 
responsible, there can be no liability, since the plaintiff 
has not borne the burden. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that Greathead 
was in fact not the agent of the Company, nor was his 
employer the Roanoke Company such agent, and that 
the evidence fails to establish the contention on behalf 
of the plaintiff, as required by law. Frankly in the 
case of this trial the attorneys for the defendant, being 
~· 
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of opinion that there has ·been no proper evidence to 
establish agency on the part of Greathead or of his 
Company, and no acts being proved on the part of the 
Company itself to indicate that he was such agent, did 
not feel under such circumstances it was necessary to 
produce any evidence on the subject, but even had it 
been otherwise, under the circumstances as outlined 
above, there ~as not time or opportunity for them to do 
so. Possibly the knowledge of the attorneys that neither 
he nor the Company was in fact such agent affected the 
presentation of the case, so that this point was not . 
stressed and made clear to the Court as it should have 
been and the misconception of the Court arose from that. 
It is often true that a matter appears so plain to one 
party that in attempting to explain or handle the situa-
tion they fail to go into the matter sufficiently to make it 
clear to one who is not in as favorable position to know 
and understand the basic facts. 
2. The question of Finance Business and Insurance 
Agents. 
This question is to some extent necessarily dealt with 
in the above discussion. It is desired to call attention to 
the fact, however, that the Roanoke Company was cer-
tainly at least primarily a finance company, as stated in 
the evidence of Mr. Thornhill, himself (Rec., p. 58). 
Mr. Thornhill specifically states that it was primarily 
a finance company but "we (that is he and Greathead) 
had instructions to write additional insurance if they 
could." He explains this later by saying that they 
didn't actually write insurance but just took it up with 
their Company, as they had no authority to issue policies. 
He also states (Rec., p. 52) that the Roanoke Company 
wrote insurance through the Philadelphia Company, of 
which they were subsidiaries or sub-agents. This answer 
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shows nothing as to the agency of the Roanoke Com-
pany. The writer personally writes all his insurance 
through a certain agency. Doubtless every member of 
the Court does the same thing, but that makes neither 
the writer nor mf!mbers of the Court an agent ·of the 
Insurance Company. Attention is also called to the 
fact that Thornhill specifically states ( Rec., p. 54) that 
he did not know whether Hare & Chase were brokers or 
agents, but only that if he and Greathead got additional 
insurance they got something out of it. Thus the record 
does not disclose if the Roanoke Company were agents 
or brokers. It is noteworthy in this case that Greathead 
was not called in as an insurance agent at all, but as an 
agent of the Finance Company, to advise in regard to a 
matter entirely disassociated from the question of insur-
ance, and it was not shown that Greathead ever claimed 
he was an agent. Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (1st 
Ed.) Vol. Ill, page 2531, states as follows: 
"Where, however, an application is intrusted to 
a person who is not in fact the agent of the insurer, 
the presumption arises that such person is the agent 
of the insured." 
In this case he was specifically called in as the agent 
of the insured and not as the agent of the Company. 
Similarly on page 2532 it is stated: 
"By the weight of authority, a broker who merely 
solicits applications, and afterwards places the in-
surance with such companies as he can induce to 
take the risk, is regarded as the agent of the insured, 
and hence the insurer is not charged with knowl-
edge of matters contrary to the provisions of the 
policy of which the broker has notice, but which 
he does not · communicate to the insurer or its 
17 
authorized agent (authorities· cited). ·It is even 
held that the payment of commission to the broker, 
and the delivery of the policy to him for further 
delivery to the applicant, does not constitute the 
broker an agent of the insurer, so as to charge it 
with knowledge of matters of which he had notice 
at the inception of the contract." 
Similarly the same authority, Vol. I, page 68, states: 
"An insurance broker is ordinarily one who is 
engaged in the business of procuring insurance to 
such person as apply to him for that service. He 
is therefore usually the agent of the insured and 
will be so considered. . . . " 
J" oyce on Insurance (2nd Ed.) Vol. II, Sec. 661, 
page 1514, states as follows with reference to an agent 
who acts for both parties, and from any view in this case 
Greathead was certainly acting as agent for the in-
sured, as follows: 
"In conclusion, the general rule may be thus 
stated: If one acts by an agent, whether insured 
or insurer, he is entitled to the exclusive service of 
the agent in the transaction and to the full benefit 
of the agent's judgment and ability in making 
terms with th~ other party, and if the same person 
assumes to act for both parties to a bargain, he 
takes upon himself duties which are incompatable, 
and a contract made by him in such double capacity 
may be avoided by either party, unless made by the 
express authority of the principal, or subsequently 
ratified by him with full knowledge of the facts, 
and the principal not having ratified or authorized 
the acts of such agent, may repudiate the trans-
action without regard to any question of actual 
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fraud or of benefit or detriment accruing to him 
from such acts. In this case the agents effecting 
the policy were the local agents of the insurer, and 
general agents of the insured, and, as agents of the 
former, contracted with themselves as agents of the 
latter." 
In the instant case it must be admitted that Great-
head was acting as agent of the insured. He was called 
in by them independent of the question of insurance, 
and upon solicitation by him he was authorized to pro-
cure the insurance and his Company was actually paid 
a service fee for this work. Clearly under the authority 
above his acts should not be imputed to the Company 
and they could repudiate the transaction regardless of 
the question of fraud or of benefit or of detriment. 
We have it from Holy Writ that no man can serve 
two masters. 
Thus, we respectfully maintain that the questions of 
dealing between the Roanoke and Philadelphia Com-
panies were almost entirely questions as to the finance, 
with which the Insurance· Company had no connection 
and from which therefore no inference could be drawn 
as to any connection between the Insurance Company 
and the Roanoke Company. It is true, of course, that 
installments were in many instances paid to the Roanoke 
Company. Whether they collected this merely as finance 
agents of the Philadelphia Company or not does not 
appear. They were not collected, however, as premiums, 
or in the name of the Insurance Company. The Insur-
ance Company had collected its premium through its 
agents and if the agents representing the insured chose 
to pay that insurance and then collect it in installments 
along with their own service charge, this was no concern 




Attention is called to the fact that these installments on 
account of insurance, and which were paid with the 
automobile obligations, were not payable to anybody as 
agents, but were paid outright to the Finance Company 
and collected by them as obligations due to them. They 
could not have represented the actual premium because 
it included $17.00 more than the amount of the pre-
mium. As heretofore shown, the difference between 
brokerage and agency is expressly recognized in the law 
of Virginia. An Act of the Assembly passed March, 
1928, found in Acts of 1928, p. 1848, amended, Sec. 
168 of the Tax Code specifically recognizes the differ-
ence in providing that any person who solicits insurance, 
either on account of any person desiring to affect in-
surance, or on account of another Company licensed to 
do business in the State, "other than for insurance com-
pany or companies for which he is the duly authorized 
agent, shall be deemed to be an insurance broker," and 
further provides that he shall be· deemed to be the agent 
of the Insurance Company, if such Company is not 
licensed in the State of Virginia. The inference, of 
course, is that if the Company is licensed to do business 
in the State of Virginia, and has its own agents, such 
broker is not the agent of the Insurance Company. 
Again we refer to the fact that the evidence specifically 
discloses that Thornhill, the only witness who testified, 
did not know whether the Roanoke Company were 
brokers or agents, and that the burden was on the 
plaintiff to prove that they were in fact agents. There 
is nothing in the record to show this to be true. 
8. The question of warranty. 
It is recognized in the opinion ( p. 7) , and unques-
tionably supported by authorities, that the statements 
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made a part of the policy are warranties and that the 
statements relied on by defendant are in fact not true. 
The opinion, however, fails to note the fact that one of 
these warranties was that the automobile was owned by 
Mrs. Goad, and was to be used for her business and 
pleasure as a seamstress, or by her husband as a 
mechanic. This warranty seems to have been overlooked 
in the opinion. We have already referred to the fact 
that the Virginia cases cited by the Court in one in~ 
stance (the West case) specifically stated that the rep-
resentations in question were not waiTanties, and 
another instance, the Harrison case, there was no dis-
cussion of the question of warranties, and in both in-
stances there was no question but that the alleged agent 
was in fact an agent of the Company. 
The effect of the present opinion is, we submit, to 
over-rule what has been the accepted doctrine of the 
Virginia Court since the Morgan case hereinafter re-
ferred to, decided in 1893, and subsequently ratified and 
approved, and is likewise in conflict with the Fletcher 
case from the Supreme Court of the United States, 
hereinafter referred to, and which likewise has been ex-
pressly proved by the Virginia Court in the Poole case. 
Before taking up the Virginia cases, we desire to call 
attention to the statements of Mr. Cooley in his Briefs 
on the Law of Insurance (1st Ed.). 
Mr. Cooley in Vol. II, page 1154 states as follows: 
"The essential characteristics of warranties, al-
ready discussed in the preceding brief, justify us 
in saying with Mackie v. PletUants, 2 Bin. (Pa.) 
263, that a warranty is a condition which must be 
fulfilled in order that the policy shall attach. The 
compliance with the terms of the policy must be 





On page 1157, it is further stated: 
"From the very nature of warranties, it is evident 
that a breach of warranty is fatal to the policy, 
though the falsity constituting the breach is un-
known to the applicant and there is no intent to 
deceive the insurer." 
Again on pages 1172-3 he states: 
"That mere misrepresentations of material facts 
does not make the policy void but only voidable." 
On page 1172 he states: 
"Of course, where there special provisions ren-
dering the policy invalid, unless certain facts exist, 
as in Leathers v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 224 
N. H. 259~ and Froehly v. North St. L. M ut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 302, policies must be re-
garded as void ab initio if such condition is not 
fulfilled. It has, too, been held that a breach of 
condition precedent renders the policy void at its 
inception, so that it never attaches:'" (Italics ours.) 
It will be noted here that Mr. Cooley takes this state-
ment as a matter "of course." In the instant case the 
conditions set out in the policy were expressly stated to 
be conditions precedent to the validity of the policy, and 
as will be shown the insured is always held to know what 
the policy states and cannot profit by a claim that he 
failed to read .it and did not know. 
Again in Vol. Ill, page 2570, the same authority 
states: 
"There is a line of well-considered and important 
cases in which it is held, in e:ffect, that the insured is 
bound not only to answer the questions put to him 
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correctly, but to use due diligence to see that the 
answers are correctly written, and if he signs the 
application without reading it, or ha~g it read to 
him, that of itself is inexcusable negligence." 
The Court then cites. the Virginia case of JT irginia 
F. ~ M. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 90 Va. 290, 18 S. E., 191, 
and "the leading . case" of N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Fletcher, 117 U. S., 519, 29 L. Ed. 934, which cases 
will be discussed below. 
Taking up the Virginia authorities we find the Mor-
gan case cited immediately above. That involved war-
ranty known as the "iron safe" clause, which specified 
th~t the insured would keep proper accounts and keep 
his books in an iron safe, 'etc. The insured warranted in 
his application that he would comply. He did not in 
fact comply and he attempted to prove at the trial that 
he could not read English, that the application was 
filled out by the Agent, that he did not tell him that he 
would comply with this provision, and that the answers 
were not read to him. The opinion of the Court reversed 
the lower court in allowing recovery and holds that the 
warranty must be strictly complied with and that oral 
evidence was incompetent to vary or contradict it, and 
that the question of whether the warranties are material 
or not is immaterial, since they are expressly made con-
ditions precedent to recovery. The Court uses the fol-
lowing language in referring to a previous case: 
"The plaintiff it was said, was bound not only to 
answer the questions put to him correctly, but to 
use due diligence to see that the answers were cor-
rectly written, and if he signed the application 
without reading it or having it read to him, that in 












The Court expressly approved this statement and 
denied him recovery. In that case the question is whether 
the insured was bound to know what was in his applica-
tion, regardless of the fact that he could not even read. 
;;; The case at bar is a stronger case, because here the ques-
tion is whether he was bound to know the provisions of 
the policy itself, which was his contract, and here, too, 
the application was filled up by a man who must be 
admitted to have been the agent of the insured herself, 
even if he should be held to be also the agent of the 
Company. If the Company was held to be bound by 
the acts of its agents, certainly the rule should work the 
other way, and in any event the ruling in the above case 
is that the warranty could not be avoided but must be 
strictly com plied with. 
I 
\ 
The Morgan case is cited and approved in the case of 
Prudential Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 104 Va. 856, in 
opinion written by Buchanan, J" ., in which the Court 
says: 
"The decision in the Morgan case seems to be in 
accord with the weight of authority. In that case 
the Court allowed the recovery, because it held that 
the statements in question were under the pro-
visions of the policy not warranties but mere rep-
resentations." 
It expressly approves the holding in the Morgan case 
and said that it agrees with the weight of authority. 
An instructive case is that of Royal Insurance Com-
pany v. Poole, 148 Va. 868, decided in 1927. In that 
case the policy contained a provision that the Company 
could not be bound by any act or statement made by 
any agent or other person, which was not contained in 
the application which had been signed by the claimant. 
\~-
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Recovery was denied on the ground that there had been 
a violation of the provisions of the policy and the knowl-
edge of the agent was therefore not-to be imputed to 
the Company. This case, it will be noted, dealt spec-
ifically with a warranty. This case discusses and 
approves the Fletcher case and differentiates a number 
of Virginia cases dealing with representations or situa-
tions where there was no question' of the fact of the 
agency or of warranty. In the instanct case the policy 
itself served notice on the defendant that it was issued 
upon condition that the warranties therein set out were 
true. It was a specific notice that the Company was 
relying on them as such and that they must be true. The 
Court (page 370) quotes the Fletcher case with ap-
proval in the following statement: 
"It is of course, not necessary to argue that the 
agent had no authority from the Company to falsify 
the answers, or that the assured could acquire no 
rights by virtue of his falsified answers. Both he 
and the Company were deceived by the fraudulent 
conduct of the agent. The assured was placed in 
the position of making false representations in 
order to secure a valuable contract which, upon a 
truthful report of his condition could not have been 
obtained. By them the Company was imposed 
upon and induced to enter into the contract. In 
such case, assuming that both parties acted in good 
faith, justice would require that the contract be 
cancelled and the premiums returned. As the 
present action is not for such a cancellation, the 
only recovery which the plaintiff could properly 
have upon the facts he asserts, taking in connection 
with the limit upon the powers of the agent, is for 
the amount of the premiums paid, and to that only 












The Court continues the quotation by saying that it 
was the duty of the insured to read the application as he 
knew that upon it the policy would be issued, if issued 
at all, and that it would introduce great uncertainty in 
all business transactions "if a party making written 
proposal for a contract with representations to induce its 
execution, should be allowed to show after it had been 
obtained that he did not know the contents of his pro-
posals, and to enforce it, notwithstanding their falsity 
as to matters essential to its obligation and validity." 
The Court then goes into and distinguishes a large 
number of cases and holds that it would be a monstrous 
injustice to an insurance company to hold it responsible 
for the acts, even of an admitted agent and that "if 
an agent is apparently acting for a principal, but is 
really acting for himself or third person, and against his 
principal, there can he no agency in respect to that 
transaction, at least as between the agent himself, or the 
person for whom· he is really acting, and the prin-
cipal. . . . The fraud could not he perpetrated by the 
agent alone. The aid of the plaintiff or the insured 
either as >an accomplice or as an instrument was essen-
tial." Opinion, p. 378. 
At the same page the Court further says that it is 
duty of the insured· to use reasonable diligence to see 
that the answers are correctly written and that the in-
surer has a right to assume that he will do it and that the 
insured "has it in his power to prevent this species of 
fraud and the insurer has not." This opinion likewise 
expressly approves the Fletcher case and distinguishes 
the Wilkinson case and a number of Virginia cases. 
We call attention to the fact that in practically all of 
the cases where the Company has ~een held to waive 
conditions and certain warranties, it was on the basis that 
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the insured was not himself a party to the false answers 
and statements, since he either answered correctly and 
the agent had written incorrectly, or that no questions 
had been asked and the agent had filled the answers in 
on his own initiative. In the instant case the insured 
knew, as well as the agent, that the answers were not 
correct; that the automobile was not owned by the named 
assured; that it was encumbered by a lien; and that it 
would not be used by a seamstress and the mechanic 
husband for their business and pleasure, but for an in-
dependent use as a commercial delivery of groceries. 
·The fact that the insured is himself aware of the false 
answers and knows that they are not written in accord-
ance with the fact, makes a great difference in the ques-
tion of waiver. This is recognized in a note found in 
L. N. S. 1915 A, in which the annotater, in dealing with 
the effect of agents insertion of false answers specifically 
states that the note is based on cases in which the answers 
were correctly given and the insured was unaware that 
they had been inserted falsely, and does not deal with 
many cases "where the claim of estoppel or waiver was 
based upon the agent's knowledge of real facts, but there 
was no claim that the insured was unaware of the answers 
as written in the application.". The annotater refers to 
another note to the effect that where the insured had 
answered correctly and was unaware of the incorrect 
answers that this "places him in quite a different position 
from one he would occupy if he knew that the answers 
as written in the application were incorrect." In short, 
the annotater recognizes that the insured does not oc-
cupy so favorable a position when, as here, he knows 
that the policy is issued on false statements. Again 
in note in 13 L. N. S., page 865, the annotater refers 
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with apparent approval to a West Virginia case and 
quotes from it as follows: 
"An insurance company deals with persons far 
off, and has to do so by agents. If bound by their 
waiver of agreements between the insured and the 
agents, it would be ruined. It would be subject to 
oral evidence sometimes true, oftener false. It is 
absolutely necessary that it put its terms and con-
ditions in its policy; and, if you nullify these, it has 
no protection. You impair, destroy, its contracts.', 
We commend to the special attention of the Court 
the leading case, and which is universally recognized as 
such, of N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher., 117 U.S., 519, 
29 L. Ed. 984. In that case the opinion of Mr. J" ustice 
Field goes very thoroughly into the question of war-
ranties, very thoroughly into the authorities, and dis-
tinguishes them as applicable to warranties. In that 
case it was stated in the application that the powers of 
the agent were limited. It was claimed that the insured 
had given correct information and the agent had written 
it in incorrectly. The Court refers to the fact that in 
many of the cases holding the insurance company had 
waived provisions, there was no knowledge brought to 
the assured of any limit upon the power of the agent. 
The Court says on pages 988-9, 29 L. Ed.: 
"Here the power of the agent was limited and 
notice of such limitation was given by being em-
bodied in the application which the assured was 
required to make and sign and which, as we have 
stated, he must be presumed to have read. He is, 
therefore, bound by its statements." 
The Court cites (beginning at page 989), with ap-
proval the case of Ryan v. World Mut. Life Ins. Co . ., 
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in which the authority of the agent was limited to receiv-
ing application, forwarding it, receiving and counter-
signing and delivering policy and collecting premiums. 
The claimant attempted to prove that the answers to the 
application, which was made a part of the policy, were 
correctly made by the insured and falsely written in by 
the agent, and in which the Court held that the Company 
was not bound and that liability could not be based on 
the claim that the application was signed without being 
read, and Justice Fields states: 
\ 
"It was held that the Company was not bound by 
the policy; that the power of the agent would not 
be extended to an act done by him in fraud to the 
Company and for the b~nefit of the insured, espe-
cially where it was in the power of the assured, by 
reasonable diligence, to defeat the fraudulent in-
tent; that the signing of the application without 
reading or hearing it read was inexcusable negli-
gence." 
The Court also refers to the fact that fraud or error 
of this kind could not be perpetrated by the agent alone, 
and the insured was necessarily a party thereto. Again, 
at the bottom of page 939 the Court says: 
"There is another view of this case equally fatal 
to recovery; assuming that the answers of the as-
sured were falsified, as alleged, the fact would be at 
once disclosed by the· copy of the application, 
annetJJed to the poliCfJJ, to which its attention was 
called. He would have discovered by inspection 
that fraud had been perpetrated, not only upon 
himself but upon the Company and it would have 
been his duty to make the fact known to the Com-
pany. He could not hold the policy without ap-
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proving the action of the agents and thus becoming 
a participant in the fraud committed/~ (Italics 
ours.) 
Again on page 940 quotes with approval from another 
case, as follows: 
"But in such case it will be the duty of the in-
sured when he receives the policy promptly to 
e:camine the same; and, if it does not contain the 
stipulations agreed upon, to at once notify the 
Company of such fact and of his refusal to accept 
the policy." (Italics ours.) 
And again on the same page: 
"A policy was accordingly issued, which declared 
that it was made and accepted in reference to the 
application, and that the assured, by accepting it, 
covenanted that the application contained a just, 
full and true statement of all the facts and circum-
stances in regard to the condition, situation, value 
and risk of the property insured, and that if any 
fact or circumstance were not fairly represented, 
the policy should be void." 
These last quotations might well be written about the 
policy in question. 'fhey are the solemn pronouncement 
of a doctrine by the highest court of our land and have 
been accepted and followed generally by courts since the 
decision in that case. The instant case is stronger for the 
defendant, in that it is not claimed that the assured did 
not know that the facts set out in the policy were in fact 
untrue. 
It is, thus, respectfully submitted that under the doc-
trines of the Virginia Courts and the general doctrine as 
approved and laid down by J" udge Cooley, and under 
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decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
warranties in this case were not waived and were known 
to be untrue by the insured; especially since attention 
was specifically called to the warranties in the policy 
itself which, as the Fletcher case sets out, it was the 
duty of the claimant to read, and the fact that the Com-
pany relied upon these statements and expressly made \ 
them conditions precedent to recovery. 
4. The warranty as to the use of the automobile. 
Attention has already been called to the fact that the 
Court in its opinion made no reference to the warranty 
that the car would be used by a seamstress and her 
mechanic husband for their pleasure and business, when 
in fact, neither she nor her husband had any interest in 
the automobile and it was used and intended to be used 
from the. time the policy was written for commercial 
delivery. The Company thought it was insuring an 
adult, when it was in fact insuring an infant; that the 
car was to be used for the business and pleasure of a 
seamstress and mechanic, when in fact it was used for 
commercial delivery.. The statements were warranted 
to be true. There is no evidence in the record that even 
Greathead was ever told of the actual facts in this 
respect, except that the car was owned by the infant. 
There is absolutely nothing to show that he was advised 
that the infant would use it in a commercial delivery 
business. 
Not only is this matter in violation of an expressed 
warranty in the policy, but the uncontradicted testimony 
of witness Ingram shows that a higher premium would 
have been required had in been stated that the car was 
to be used for delivery of groceries. He explains the 
difference in detail and the reasons underlying, and 
expressly states that the cheapest rate in Lynchburg 
31 
for a commercial car is $31.00 (Rec., p. 77). He says 
that the designation of pleasure and business use for an 
ordinary individual designates that it might be used for 
business or any private use for which any individual 
might need to use· it with the exception of commercial 
business and "any car used for commercial delivery 
would be classed as a commercial automobile and take 
commercial rates." It is uncontradicted that the pre-
mium in question is $20.00, while that for commercial 
delivery would be $31.00 at the cheapest rate for such 
use. As stated, this matter is not dealt with in the 
opinion and it is apparently overlooked, possibly due to 
the fact that in oral argument defendant in error did 
not complete the argument nor reach this point. His 
time had expired and he was forced to close before 
treating on this point. However, it is treated on page 15 
of the petition and on page 20 of the Reply Brief. The 
opinion of the Court expressly recognizes that the state-
ments in question are made warranties in the policy and 
avoided unless waived. In this case there is no evidence 
whatsoever to show that eithe~ Greathead or the Com-
pany knew t.hat the automobile would be used for a 
com,mercial delivery, as it is admitted it was used, and 
was intended to be used. Even if the Company should 
be held to have waived the other provisions, very clearly 
it seems this provision, which is the only one expressly 
proved by the evidence to be material, has not been 
waived, since no knowledge whatsoever has been brought 
home to either the Company or Greathead. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion attorneys for the I;nsurance Company 
state that in twenty-one years of practice by the writer 
of this brief, during which time he has had the good 
82 
fortune to appear in this Court in at least a fair number 
of cases, he has accepted in good grace adverse decisions, 
as he shall accept this one if this petition is denied; he 
has never before :filed a petition for rehearing, feeling 
that in ordinary cases one presentation to the Court is 
all that should be available. If the question here were 
merely one of $2,500.00, this petition would not be pre-
sented, but we feel that the decision of the Court in this 
case involves principles of far reaching importance and 
of disastrous import to insurance companies. We ~ow 
that the Court desires to reach the right in every case 
and to establish law in the State of Virginia, which shall 
be in accord with justice and right, and the establish-
ment of sound and abiding legal principles. We, there-
fore, submit with confidence that this case should be 
reheard and opinion should be rendered reversing the 
judgment of the lower court, and entering final judg-
ment for the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CASKIE, FROST & COLEMAN, 
.A. ttorneys for 
Royal Indemnity Company. 
